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IN T,HE SUPRE,ME COURT
of the
STATIE OF U'T'AH
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, also known
as BILL CHRISTENSEN and CELESTE
CHRISTENSEN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.-

Civil No.

8966

EMERON CHRISTENSEN and KATHLEEN CHRISTENSEN, husband and
wife,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

Appeal from the District Court of the SiXth Judicial
District in and for the County of Sevier, State of Utah.
HoNORABLE JoHN L. SEVY, JR., District Judge
The Plaintiffs and Respondents will be referred to as
"Respondents" and the Defendants and Appellants will be
ref~rred to as "Appellants."
STATEMEN'T OF FACTS
The Appellants' Statement of Facts is substantially
accurate to the extent it has gone. However, Appellants
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have omitted any reference to facts unfavorable to their
position. In the first place, the Respondent William
Christensen and the Appellant Emeron Christensen are
brothers (R. 11). Both are farmers but William Christensen also does trucking work (R. 20). Prior to and
during the spring of 1942 the Respondent William Christensen was the owner of a thirty-five-acre (actually 34.20
acres) tract of land and seventeen and one-half shares
of the Capital Stock of Elsinore Irrigation Company,
used on the land, and Respondents also owned eleven and
one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company, said
land and water stock being mortgaged to The Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley (R. 12). Also, the home of the
Respondents at Richfield, Utah, was mortgaged to The
Federal Land Bank and Respondents had executed and
delivered to said Bank a Deed to be held until the mortgage indebtedness was paid in full. The Appellant
Emeron Christensen was farming, along with other property, a fifteen-acre tract across the road kitty-corner
from the William Christensen propert:~, oyrned of record
by the Appellant Kathleen Christensen (R. 4). Twentytwo and one-half shares of the Capital Stock of Sevier
Valley Irrigation Company, ow·ned of record by the .Appellant Emeron Christensen, were then and had been
used on said property since 1928 (R. 4 and 13). ~'-ppellant
IDmeron Christensen had ·also been fanning two additional tracts of land, one a two-ac.re piece and the other an
eight-acre tract, title to which "\Yas acquired by hiinself
and his wife as joint tenants (R ....t\..-38 and R. 15). These
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two tracts will hereafter be referred to as the ten-acre
tract.
In the spring of 1942, William and Emeron Christensen made a verbal agreement to trade land and water,
the details of which are as follows:
Appellants were to pay off the indebtedness
due The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley against
Respondents' home and AppeHants were to convey
to the Respondents the fifteen-acre tract of land,
together with twenty-two and one-half shares of
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water. In return Respondents were to convey to Appellants
the thirty-five acre tract of land and seventeen
and one-half shares of water of the Elsinore Irrigation Canal Company (R. 17 and 18). At the
same time and as a part of the same transaction
Appellants agreed to sell to the Respondents the
ten-acre tract of land for One Thousand Dollars
(R. 18), and Respondents were to use on said land
the eleven and onec.half shares of Sevier Valley
Irrigation Company water which they already
owned (R. 62). The sales price was payable in
livestock and credits for hauling Emeron Christensen's beet pulp. Also, Respondent William
Christensen hauled commodities for third persons
and they paid the Appellants who were to credit
the account of the Respondents (R. 92 and 93).
Respondents were to pay the taxes and title to the
ten acres was to pass to Respondents "right away''
(R. 19). The transaction was not to bear any
interest (R. 62).
Respondents immediately went into possession of the
ten acres of land with Appellants' knowledge and approval. Respondents turned over to the Appellants two
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cows, one bay mare, one black steer, three calves and two
heifers at agreed valuations per animal and the Appellants later sold the animals to third persons (R. 21 to 23).
Beginning in the fall of 1942 and continuing through the
spring of 1944 Respondent William Christensen hauled
at an agreed valuation of $1.50 per ton, 170 tons of beet
pulp from the Gunnison Sugar Company (Exhibit 1 and
R. 97). From time to time Respondent also hauled commodities for third persons who paid the Appellants for
the hauling work. The value of the livestock and the hauling services was $684.00, leaving a balance of $316.00
payable.
In June of 1942 Appellants delivered to Respondents
the Deed to their Richfield, Utah, home and the Abstracts
of 'Title on the ten-acre tract (Exhibits 2 and 3), together
with a Deed to the fifteen-acre tract. Appellants assured
Respondents that they would complete the transaction
for the sale of the ten-acre tract and that they would
secure and deliver to the Respondents a Certificate for
twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier 'Talley Irrigation Company Water (R. 29 to 31). Respondents delivered
to Appellants at this time their Deed to the thirty-five
acre tract of property and a certificate for seventeen and
one-half shares of water of Elsinore Irrigation Canal
Company.
During the course of more than hYo years thereafter
Appellant Emeron ·Christensen assured the Respondents
on numerous occasions that, with respect to the preparation and delivery of a Deed to the ten acres of property
and the Certificate for twenty-two and one-half shares of
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Sevier Valley Irrigation Company Water Stock, "I will
have it all fixed up for you right away,'' using as an excuse for his failure to execute and deliver the said Deed
and Water Certificate, that he was then too busy with
other matters (R. 32 to 35). Emeron Christensen did not,
however, keep his word.
In November of 1955, Respondents offered to pay
Appellants in cash the balance of the purchase price but
Appellants again declined to accept the balance payable
or to deliver the Deed and Water Stock Certificate (R.
38). It was at this time, however, that Appellant Emeron
Christensen asked Respondent William Christensen to
lease the land to him but Respondent William Christensen
could not oblige him as the property was then leased to
third person (R. 38 and 39).
In the early spring of 1956 Appellants dispossessed
the Respondents from the ten acres, claiming that the
property was theirs and that the agreement for sale and
purchase was cancelled (R. 42).
When the Respondent William Christensen took possession of the ten acres it had not been fertilized for
several years and the fences were down and the soil was
rough and hilly with numerous high and low spots. An
old road passed the property but it was impassible (R.
44). Respondent manured the property (R. 49) and
planted sugar beets. Again in 1944 and 1945 the ground
was manured and planted to beets and grain (R. 48). In
the winter of 1945 and the spring of 1946 Respondent had
the land leveled (Exhibit 4) and the irrigation system
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was changed for better water coverage. Respondents'
cost was $385.00 (R. 52 :and 53). The fences on the North
and West side of the property were repaired and posts
and wires replaced. Fencing was maintained by the Respondent until he leased the property in 1946 (R. 54). In
1944 Respondent vVilliam Christensen spent three weeks
of his time helping with repairs to the road to the property in order to make it usable (R. 55). Beginning with
the crop year 1946 Respondents leased the property to
third persons who planted crops, fertilized the land and
maintained and improved the fencing (R. 55). Regarding
the fifteen-acre tract sold to Respondents by Appellants
and upon which they received a Deed, but no Certificate
for twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley
Water, Respondent William Christensen and his Lessees
farmed the ground each year from 1942 to 1955 and used
thereon the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier
Valley Irrigation Company water that . A. ppellant had
previously used on the ground. In the spring of 1956 the
Appellant Emeron Christensen ordered the Irrigation
Company not to turn the water on to the land (R. 57 to
59).

Respondents' Lessee, Tahnage Christensen, testified
that he leased and farmed the ten acres and the fifteen
acres after 1951 and that he used thereon a total of thirtythree and one-half shares of water (twenty-two :and onehalf shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company from
the fifteen acre tract and eleven shares of Sevier Yalley
Irrigation Con1pany water from the ten acre tract) ....1\..ppellant knew Anderson was renting the land and the
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water but never objected until1956 when he dispossessed
Anderson (R. 77 to 79).
Respondent Celeste Christensen testified that she
personally paid the taxes on the ten acres each year frmn
1942 to 1955 (Exhibit 5 and R. 98 and 99). Mrs. Christensen also testified about the meetings of June, 1942, when
the Abstracts of Title on the ten acres were delivered to
Respondents, and the meeting of November, 1955, at Appellants' home at Elsinore, Utah, on both of which occasions Appellants assured the Respondents that Appellants would see that the Deed to the ten acres of land and
the Certificate for the twenty-two and one-half shares of
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water were prepared
and delivered "one of these days as soon as we have time"
(R. 101 to 103). Mrs. Christensen kept an accurate record
of the animals turned over to Appellants together with
their valuations, together with the hauling of commodities for third person (Exhibit 6 and R. 106 to 110).
Appellant Emeron Christensen, in his testimony,
flatly and absolutely denied having any conversations
with Respondents about the foregoing matters or making
any agreement whatever for the sale of the ten acres of
land or the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier
Valley Irrigation Company water (R. 119 and 120) but
contended that he merely permitted the Respondents to
use the ten acres of land and the twenty-two and one-half
shares of water between 1942 and 1954 (R. 120 and 121).
Appellant Emeron Christensen further denied that he
had delivered the Abstracts of Title on the ten acres of
land to the Respondents (R. 121) or that the Respondents
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had delivered to him any animals (R. 122). Appellant
acknowledged that the Respondent had hauled a quantity
of coal and beet pulp for him but he contended that the
Respondents had been paid in full (R. 123).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE DE1CISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW.

(a) The Evidence Was Entirely Sufficient To
Prove The Existence Of A Contract As To Both Causes
of Action And To Justify A Decree Of Specific Performance.
(b) The Contract Relied Upon As To Both Causes
Of Action Was Not Barred By The Statute Of Frauds.
(e) The Second Cause of Action Was Not Barred
By The Statute Of Limitations.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
RECEIVING FROM COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS AND
RESPONDENTSLETTERSANDSTATEMENTSAFTERTHE
TRIAL OF THE CASE.
POINT III.
NO ERROR WAS COMMTTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
ARGU~IENT

ON POINTS

POINT I.
THE DgCISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW.

(a) 'The Evidence 'Yas Entirely Sufficient To
Prove The Existence Of A Contract As. To Both Causes
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of Action And To Justify A Decree Of Specific Performance.
Respondents agree with the principal of law established in Montgomery v. Berrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569,
cited by Appellants, that the Plaintiffs seeking the specific performance of a parol contract must show a clear,
mutual understanding and a positive assent to the terms
of the Contract. See also Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86
P. 768.
It has been said that a ·Contract is a transaction in
which each party comes under an obligation to the other
and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised
by the other. Dartmouth College. v. W oodwar.d, 4 Wheat
(U.S.) 518, 4 L. ed. 629. Expressed in its simplest terms,
the reciprocal duties of Appellants and Respondents
were the following:
APPELLANTS' D,UTIES
1. To pay off the existing debt of the Respondents to The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley
and to deliver to Respondents the Deed held by
the Bank.
'2. To convey to Respondents the 15-acre
tract of property -and 22lf2 shares of stock in
Sevier Valley Irrigation Company.
3. To convey to Respondent the 10.00-acre
tract of property upon payment of the purchase
price of $1000.00.
RESPONDENTS' DUTIES
1.

To convey to Appellants the 35.00-acre
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tract of real estate and 17lf2 shares of Elsinore
Irrigation Canal Company water stock.
2. To pay the Appellants $1000.00 for the
10.00-acre tract of property either in cash or in
services or other commodities.
Appellants attempt to separate and to detach from
the other mutual duties Appellants' No. 3 and Respondents' No. 2 duties listed above. It is signifieant to note,
however, that all of the Respondents' evidence goes to the
proposition that there was but one agreement and one
contract embracing all of the duties and rights of the
parties. Appellants chose to flatly and unequivocably
deny the existence of any agreement, duty or responsibility, but the irrefutable facts are that the Appellants
did pay The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley $1,832.50
to release its lien on Respondents' property; Appellants
did secure and deliver to Respondents the Deed to their
Richfield, Utah, home; and Appellants did convey to the
Respondent Celeste Christensen the fifteen-acre tract of
land above referred to. It is obvious, therefore, that the
Appellants from the very beginning had a clear understanding of their duties, as far as they chose to perform
them. They proceeded with haste to perform all of Duty
No. 1 and half of Duty No. ~. Also they permitted Respondents to perforrn their Duty No. 1 and substantially
to perform their Duty No. 2. At no ti1ne did Appellants
doubt the existence of Contract rights against the Respondents and it ill behooves the1n now, after realizing
substantially all of the benefits frmn the Contract, to
urge equity to rleelare that no Contract exiMed.
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We submit that every necessary element of a Contract is clearly established by the Respondents' case.
There is neither uncertainty nor indefiniteness as to
any of its terms. The crux of Appellants' argument appears to be that in no event can a Contract be established
because the Appellant Emeron Christensen denied in his
testimony that none existed. Ris actions would strongly
indicate otherwise. Brotherly affection would not move
even Emeron Christensen to pay The Federal Land Bank
of Berkeley $1,832.50 without a good reason. Nor would
Appellants have delivered to the Respondents the Abstracts of Title on the ten-acre tract if Respondents were
only "using the land" until Appellants wanted it. Further, it is difficult to imagine Appellants permitting
Respondents to use twenty-two and one-half shares of
Appellants' water for 13 years unless Appellants well
knew that the land and the water had been sold to the
Respondents. We suggest to the Court that the reason
why the Appellants suddenly contended that there was no
Contract relating to the ten acres of land and the Twentytwo and one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water relates to the general drought in South Central Utah beginning in 1955 and the fact the Appellants'
son had recently purchased from Appellants' attorney a
tract of realty abutting on the ten acres in this law suit
and the Appellant Emeron Christensen and his son "are
farming together" (R. 137).
The fact that Respondents' agreement with the Appellants enabled thern to pay for the ten acres over an
unspecified period of time does not, as Appellants conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tend, reduce the agreement to something less than a contract. The authorities are to the effect that where •a Contract to render services is silent as to the time of payment
for the services, payment is due when the services have
been rendered. See 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 304
and the cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 519.
Also: The Synopses of the following cases from Vol.
3, A.L.R. Digest, page 743 are significant :
The term "any time'' used in a contract, although a relative term subject to variation in
meaning according to the facts and circumstances
of the case, is nevertheless to be given its ordinary meaning, in the absence of special circumstances indicating that it was not intended to have
such meaning.
Haworth v. Hubbard, 220 Indiana 611, 44 N.E. 2d
967.

In the absence of agreement as to payment
for work under a building contract no payment
can be demanded until the work is substantially
performed.
Stewart v. Newbury, 220 NY 379,115 NE 984.

Thus it appears that as a 1natter of law Respondents
could not have required Appellants to deliver the Deed
to the ten-acre tract until the $1000.00 purchase price had
been paid. But the more ilnportant consideration is that
even so, such an agreement is perfectly valid and enforceable, if not within the Statute of Frauds.
fn answer to Appellants' emnplaint that all·of the

tenns and conditions of the Contract of the parties are
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garnered from Respondents' case "with not so much as
one receipt or the scratch of a pen to show the existence
of the Contract by the Defendants or the credit of payment thereon of services or livestock by the Defendants•'
to quote Appellants' Brief at page 13 thereof, we can only
say that it served Emeron Christensen's purpose not to
keep a receipt or a record of any kind. In the beginning
Emeron and William Christensen dealt with one another
at something less than arm's length and appeared to enjoy one another's respect and confidence (R. 66). It was
imprudent though not unnatural nor uncommon that they
did not reduce their agreement to writing and keep adequate records. But the lower court concluded that Appellants' unblinking deni,al of the entire affair as it related to
the sale of the ten acres of land and the twenty-two and
one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company
water stock simply did not square with convincing and entirely believable testimony and evidence of Respondents'
case. We submit that the Respondents told the strict
truth at the trial as it related to their transaction or
they did not. The lower court, being in a position to
judge the demeanor of the witnesses as well as other
factors, found that a contract did exist, that the rights,
duties and responsibilities thereof were not severable
and that the contract was in every respect capable of
specific performance. Other than Appellant Emeron
Christensen's complete and general denial, there is absolutely no evidence to the contrary. Further, we have noted
with interest that the Appellant, Emeron Christensen,
did not call upon his wife, Kathleen Christensen, to testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fy in the case as a corroborative witness to the fact that
there was no agreement relating to the 10 acres of property and to the 22lf2 shares of Sevier Valley water and
that the abstracts of title were not delivered to Respondents.
She was present at all of the meetings with Respondents except for the initial meeting in the spring of 1942
and was also present in the courtroom during the trial
of this case. On this state of the record this ·Court ought
not to set aside the lower Court's decision.
"This Court is authorized by the State Constitution to review ·the Findings of the Trial Court
in equity cases, but the findings of the trial Courts
on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that the Court has misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly
against ·the weight of the evidence."

Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313.
(b) The Contract Relied Upon As To Both Causes
Of Action Was Not Barred By The Statute Of Frauds.
While it is at once apparent that the Contract between Appellants and Respondents was entirely oral,
nevertheless Respondents rely on the saving grace of
Section 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotruted, 1953, which reads:
25-5-8. RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PEHFOR~l
ANCE NOT AFFECTED. - Nothing in this
Chapter contained shall be construed to abridge
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreen1ents in ease of part performance thereof.
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Thus it is well settled in Utah that a sufficient part
performance by the purchaser under a parol contract for
the sale and purchase of real estate removes the contract
from the operation of the statute of frauds and authorizes
the Court to decree the specific performance of the agree~
ment by the vendor.
In Utah, the leading cases on this proposition are
Price v. Lloyd, supra; and Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah
575, 206 P. 262. See also Lynch v. Co·viglio, 17 Utah 106,
53 P. 983.
The true basis of the doctrine of part performance,
according to the overwhelming weight of authority, lies
in principles of equitable estoppel and frraud. It would be
a fraud upon the Respondents if the Appellants were
permitted to escape performance of their part of the oral
agreement after they have permitted the Respondents to
substantially perform in reliance upon the agreement.
In the ILargreaves v. Burton case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language
from the Price v. Lloyd decision, which language originally came from Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts, 2nd Edition, paragraph 145, to-wit:
"When a verbal contract has been made, and
one party has knowingly aided or permitted the
other to go on and do acts in part performance of
the Agreement, acts done in full reliance upon such
Agreement as a valid rand. binding Contract, and
which would not have been done without the agreement, and which are of such a nature as to change
the relation of the parties, and to prevent a reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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storation to their former condition and an adequate compensation for the loss of a legal judgment for damages, then it would be a vertual
fraud in the first party to interpose the statute
of frauds as a bar to the completion of the contract, and thus to secure for himself all of the
benefit of the acts already done in part performance, while the other party would not only lose all
the advantage from the bargain, but would be left
without adequate remedy for his failure or compensation for what he had done in pursuance of
it. To prevent the success of such a palpable
fraud, equity interposes under these circumstances, and compels an entire completion of the
contract by decreeing its specific execution."
Nowhere have we been able to locate a more exhaustive and authoritative collation of authorities on the
doctrine of part performance than that found in the annotation in volume 101 of American Law Reports beginning at page 923 entitled "Doctrine of Part Performance
in Suits for Specific Perfonnance of Parol Contracts To
Convey Real Property." Particular acts of part performance generally recognized as sufficient to take an oral
contract out of the clutches of the Statutes of Frauds
are there catalogued under the general headings of possession, possession coupled with other acts, ilnprovements, payment of the purchase price, payn1ent of taxes,
etc. Not all of these acts are required in every case, and
what constitutes perfornutnee must depend upon the particuar faets of each case. See Veum v. Sheeran, 95 :L\finn.
315, 104 N.W. 135.
~
The lHah cases above cited adopt the rule that possession of the property must be coupled with some other

-
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act or acts of part performance, depending on the specific and particular circumstances of the case. In the
instant case there can be no doubt of the fact that Respondents went into possession of the property and that
they and their tenants and agents held possession for
fourteen years, openly ~and notoriously, pursuant to the
contract and exclusive of the rights of Appellants. Their
possession was continuous and there was neither abandonment, surrender nor interruption of possession. All
this was accomplished with the knowledge and consent
of the Appellants. And in addition, Respondents also
made valuable and permanent improvements upon the
property consisting of fertilizing and cultivating the land,
leveling of the ground, improvements to existing ditches,
the construction of a new irrigation system, construction
of new fencing and maintenance of old fencing and road
improvements. All of these improvements were referable exclusively to the contract and were such as would
not have been performed except for the contract. See
Pr,ice v. Lloyd and Hargreaves v. Burton} supra.
In the case of Drake v. Smith} 14 Utah 35, 45 P. 1006
and Karren v. Rainey} 30 Utah 7, 83 P. 333, this court held
that the erection and maintenance of fences in addition
to other improvements on the property was sufficient to
constitute part performance of an oral contract for the
sale and purchase of land.
In Bracken v. Chadburn} 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021,
this Court also held that the construction and maintenance of irrigation ditches and canals was sufficient part
performance of an oral contract to convey property.
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In Hazen v. Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 P. 1097, this
court held that payment of the purchase price when
coupled with possession and the making of valuable
improvements in reliance upon the oral contract constituted a sufficient part performance to entitle the vendor
to specific performance. See also collected cases from
other jurisdiction on this point at Note 88, 101 A.L.R.

1056.
We also call to the court's 'attention the recent case
of In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P. 2d 595,
wherein this Court held that where there was no memorandum reduced to writing, but the deceased had accepted
the consideration and surrendered possession there was
sufficient part performance to avoid the statute of frauds
and the deeeased 's heirs and successors in title and interest should not be allowed to repudiate the oral contract.
It is acknowledged in the instant case that the Respondent had not paid all of the purchase price at the
time they were dispossessed by the Appellants, but the
difference between payment of all and a major portion
of the purchas~ price would appear to be imn1aterial in
view of this court's decision in the recent case of In re
Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278, wherein this
court held that the evidence supported a finding of part
performance where the Defendant took possession of the
property, made improvements thereto and paid half of
the purchase price and had tendered the ren1aining purchase price to the Vendor.
Although we can find no specific Utah authorities
directly in point relating to fertilizing the ground, cultivation of the land, ground leveling work and road imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
provements, we refer to the court to the collation of
American authorities on these points in 33 A.L.R. beginning at page 1489 in the annotation entitled "Character
and Extent of Improvements Necessary To Constitute
Part Performance," wherein the authorities hold that the
making of such improvements coupled with such other
acts as the particular circumstances of the individual
case require, constitute sufficient part performance to
justify a court in decreeing specific performance of an
oral contract for the s:ale and purchase of land. Also,
while it is admittedly true that the payment of taxes alone
is not sufficient part performance, we refer the court's
attention to the cases cited in Notes 67, 68 and 69 on page
1109 of 101 A.L.R. holding that payment of taxes, when
added to other acts of part performance, will suffice to
take a contract for the sale and purchase of real property
out of the statute of frauds.
Appellants in their Breif go to some length to belittle
the Respondents' acts of part performance. They allege
that Respondents' possession of the property was not
under the Contract, but rather, it was out of the goodness
of Emeron ·Christensen's heart. Also, at page 17 of Appellants' Brief it is asserted with apparent seriousness
that this case does not involve actual possession and
permanent improvements. We can only reply that the
undisputed facts of the case show possession in every
sense of the word and the weight of legal authority establishes that the improvements made were both permanent
and substantial.
In a final effort to whittle down the stature of ReSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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spondents' case, Appellants cite the dicta in the Price vs.
Lloyd case supra and the case of Moffat vs. Hoffman,
61 Utah 482, 214 P. 308 that "where the improvements
do not exceed the rental value of the property they will
not be regarded as of such a substantial value and character as to constitute part performance so as to take the
case out of the statute" (quotation from the Price vs.
Lloyd case, supra). A careful reading of both of these
cases will show that any excess of value of the use of the
land over the value of the improvements is not the test
in determining the character and permanency of the
improvements, but is only one of the circumstances to be
taken into consideration in determining whether the purchaser who made the improvements suffered a loss or
injury. In the instant case the record will show that when
the reasonable value of the Respondent William Christensen's time and effort is given proper consideration and
is added to the value of the fertilizing of the land, the
cultivation thereof, the leveling of the ground, the improvements made to existing ditches, the construction of
new irrigation ditches, new fencing and the maintenance
of old fencing and road improvements, they far exceed
Appellants' estimate of rental value of $40.00 per acre
and perfectly illustrate the reason why the doctrine of
part performance was invoked by the Courts of equity,
to-wit, to prevent injury and damage from being inflicted
upon one who relied in good faith upon an oral contract.
No judgment for da1nages could adequately recon1pense
the Respondents.
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(c) The Second Cause of Action Was Not Barred
By The Statute Of Limitations.
Appellants apparently concede that Respondents'
First Cause of Action is not barred by the Statutes of
Limitations since they did not raise the bar of the statute
thereto. However, on the theory that Respondents' Second
Cause of Action is entirely separate, distinct and a thing
apart from Respondents' First Cause of Action, Appellants contend that the Second Cause of Action is barred
by Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
All of the evidence in the case establishes the fact
that the contract for the sale to Respondents of the
twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company Water was part and parcel of the larger
contract of the Respondents and Appellants of April,
1942 ____________ that is, unless Appellants' general denial is to
be believed. Under the terms of the Contract, Appellants
were not obligated to completely perform until Respondents has performed. Respondents had tendered their complete performance as late as the fall of 1955 (R. 104) and
were ready, willing and able to perform their part of the
bargain in the spring of 1956 when they were dispossessed
(R. 42). Thus Respondents' Cause of Action for specific
performance as to the twenty-two and one-half shares
of Sevier Valley Irrigation Company water did not mature until the Spring or 1956. It was not different in any
degree or extent from the time Respondents' First Cause
of Action matured, and as the First Cause of Action was
not barred by section 78-12-25 of Utah Code Annotated,
1953, neither was the Second Cause of Action.
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The Whvtehill vs. Lowe case, 10 Utah 419, 37 P. 589,
cited by Appellants in their Brief is clearly distinguishable from the instant case both as to the statute and the
facts and is no authority for raising the bar of limitations
in the instant case.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
RECEIVING FROM COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS AND
RESPONDENTSLETTERSANDSTATEMENTSAFTERTHE
TRIAL OF THE CASE.

VVhile it may have been somewhat irregular for the
Court to receive from counsel for both parties information not formally presented to the Court in open session,
nevertheless, no prejudice resulted to the Appellants. In
the first place the attorney for the Appellants was at all
times advised by the Court and Counsel for the Respondents of the Court's requests but Appellants' counsel at
all times, failed, refused and neglected to cooperate in any
way in assembling the requested information (R. 177).
Also, Appellants' counsel received copies of all of the
letters sent to the Trial Court (see endorsements at the
bottom of the letters (R. 173 to 175), ~and Appellants~
counsel could have objected to the 1natters set forth in
the letter of Respondents' counsel dated :Jiay 23, 1958
(R.175) if he had wanted to do so. He did not so object.
The Trial Judge's Certificate (R. 187 and 188)
states:
"That in arriving at a decision in this case
the Court took the position as stated fron1 the
bench in open court at the hearing on the Motion
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for a new trial that the issues in the case were
substantially as set forth in the letter of counsel
for the Defendants (Appellants here) dated May
20, 1958 (R. 170) ..... , and in reaching said decision the rmdersigned did not take into consideration any of the matters contained and set forth
in the letters of cormsel hereinabove referred but
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Decree of the Court dated the 16th
day of J rme, A.D. 1958, were based solely upon the
files and records of the case and upon the evidence
and testimony of the trial on October 21, 1957.
This Certificate is made for the purpose of
iinplementing and completing the record of this
cause since the above and foregoing statements
were made by the undersigned from the bench in
open court at the hearing on Defendants' Motion
for New Trial on the 22nd day of July, A.D. 1958.
The said statements hereinabove referred to were
not, however, taken down stenographically by the
Court Recorder at the time they were made and
uttered from the bench as said Court Reporter
was temporarily absent from the Courtromn
during the argument of counsel upon said Motion
for New Trial."
~\_ny

technical error committed by the Court in requesting and receiving letters and statements from counsel was harmless and resulted in no prejudice to the
.Appellants.
POINT III.
NO ERROR WAS COMMfTTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Appellants' Motion for a New Trial (R. 170) was
based on subsections (1) and (6) of Rule 59 A of the Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure relating to irregularity in the
proceedings of the Court and insufficiency of the evidence
to justify the Court's decision. Respondents respectfully
refer the Court to the Argument set forth under Points I
and II hereof where these matters are dealt with in detail.
For the reasons set forth under said arguments we
assert that the Trial Court acted properly in denying
Appellants' Motion for aNew Trial.
CONCLUSION
Respondents urge this Court to uphold the decision
of the lower court because said decision is fully supported
by the record and no error prejudicial to Appellants has
occurred in the proceedings below.
It would be a virtual fraud upon the Respondents
if the Appellants were now permitted to escape performance of their part of the oral contract after they had permitted the Respondents to substantially perform their
part of the agreement in reliance thereon. There can be
no doubt from the record that the agreement of April,
1942, existed, that its tenns \Yere in all respects exact,
definite and fully capable of specific performance. Said

agreement, by reason of its part perforn1ance is not
within the statute of frauds nor has its enforcmnent been
barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants would
have the Court believe that all parts of the contract benefiting them were real and enforceable but that the parts
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thereof relating to the sale of the ten-acres of land and
the twenty-two and one-half shares of Sevier Valley
Irrigation Company Water Stock to the Respondents
were figments of Respondents' imagination. The facts
are otherwise. The result of the Appellants' present position in this action is on its face so grossly inequitable
as to be unconscionable. We submit that for all of the
reasons heretofore stated the decision of the trial court
should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

By

C~VEL MATTSSON
JOHN

T.

VERNIEU

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
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